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ARTICLE 
MIND THE (HOMOGENEITY) GAP: 
INDEPENDENCE OF REFERRING BODIES 




How independent must referring bodies be in a European Free 
Trade Association (“EFTA”) state applying the European Economic 
Area (“EEA”) Agreement, for the purposes of requesting an advisory 
opinion from the EFTA Court? To answer the question, one must pay 
attention to not only the case law of the EFTA Court; but also the case 
law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) in a 
comparative perspective. This is because EEA law rests on the 
fundamental principle of homogeneity with European Union (“EU”) 
law. To date, the EFTA Court and the CJEU have diverged on their 
understanding of the independence of referring bodies, particularly 
tribunals, with the CJEU placing greater weight on the criterion of 
independence, whereas the EFTA Court cares far less about this factor. 
This Article unequivocally sides with the CJEU, and argues that the 
case law of the EFTA Court is deficient, and in need of rectification. 
Consequently, to close the homogeneity gap that has opened up 
between EU law and EEA law, this Article argues that the EFTA Court 
will have to bring its own case law into line with the CJEU, to ensure 
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that judicial dialogue in the EEA between the EFTA Court and 
referring tribunals shall be dialogue between independent actors. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
There is much discussion within EEA law regarding whether 
Article 34 of the Agreement between the EFTA States on the 
Establishment of a Surveillance Authority and a Court of Justice 
(“Surveillance and Court Agreement” or “SCA”) places an obligation 
on national courts and tribunals of final instance in EFTA states 
applying the European Economic Area (“EEA”) Agreement to request 
advisory opinions from the EFTA Court. Coupled with that conundrum 
is further discussion on whether national courts and tribunals of EFTA 
states may or must follow such advisory opinions once they are 
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delivered by the EFTA Court. By contrast, there is far less focus and 
analysis on the referring bodies to whom Article 34 of the SCA is 
applicable, and whether the independence of such referring bodies is 
guaranteed. This Article analyses the different interpretations of what 
a referring body is for the purposes of Article 34 of the SCA in EEA 
law before the EFTA Court, and comparatively, Article 267 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) in EU law 
before the Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), with 
specific regard to independence. 
 One of the two main types of cases that the EFTA Court hears are 
advisory opinion cases,1 which are requests from national courts and 
tribunals in EFTA states applying the EEA Agreement, for an 
interpretation of EEA law. The EEA Agreement is the international 
agreement that brings three of the four EFTA states (Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, and Norway; but not Switzerland) into the sphere of the 
EU’s internal market. The EFTA Court is the court of law responsible 
for giving interpretation of EEA law to national bodies in EFTA states 
applying the EEA Agreement, so that rights under it can be applied in 
the national legal orders.2  
The nature of the independence of referring courts in EFTA states, 
that are judicial in nature, is uncontested. However, much more curious 
is the independence of referring bodies that are tribunals in EFTA 
states, which are not necessarily judicial bodies. This is due to the fact 
that the two Nordic states that are EFTA states, Iceland and Norway, 
have extensive non-judicial bodies that could potentially come within 
the scope of Article 34 of the SCA as tribunals, which could request an 
advisory opinion from the EFTA Court. As put before the entry in force 
of the EEA Agreement, “it would seem that certain organs with 
competences, functions and structures similar to . . . courts could 
request advisory opinions.”3 The EFTA Court accepts that it is not just 
judicial bodies that come within the scope of Article 34 of the SCA, as 
it has extended the notion of a court or tribunal in EEA law to bodies 
that exercise “semi-judicial function.”4 Yet not all semi-judicial bodies 
 
1. The other main type of case is direct actions against the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
(“ESA”). 
2. See generally, Carl Baudenbacher, Some Thoughts on the EFTA Court's Phases of Life, 
in JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA 2 (2012).  
3. SVEN NORBERG ET AL., EEA LAW: A COMMENTARY ON THE EEA AGREEMENT 714 
(1993). 
4. Norwegian Appeal Board for Health Personnel – Appeal from A, Case E-1/11, EFTA 
Ct. Rep., Judgment, ¶ 42 (Dec. 15, 2011).  
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that are tribunals exercise functions in an independent manner, in the 
way that courts typically do. Tribunals are usually far less independent, 
given that they are not composed of judges, but rather, other actors like 
lawyers, academics, and other non-judicial individuals. 
The question this Article probes is how the EFTA Court deals 
with such requests for advisory opinions from referring bodies whose 
independence is in doubt. As will be demonstrated, the EFTA Court 
only has a vague interest in the status of referring bodies requesting 
advisory opinions, and has shown little regard for their independence 
(or lack thereof) in their respective national legal orders. This contrasts 
with the stricter standard applied by the CJEU in EU law, which gives 
rise to the widening of the homogeneity gap between EU law and EEA 
law. This is despite the fact that the aim of EEA law, both substantively 
and procedurally, is to be homogenous with EU law. Consequently, this 
Article argues that the EFTA Court must begin to apply a stricter 
standard, in the same way that the CJEU does. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides an initial 
explanation of the advisory opinion procedure at the EFTA Court, 
before setting forth the principle of procedural homogeneity that should 
exist between EU law and EEA law, as to be applied by the CJEU and 
the EFTA Court respectively. Part II discusses the most important case 
law of the CJEU regarding the independence of referring bodies within 
the Article 267 of the TFEU preliminary reference procedure. The 
CJEU’s newfound and indirect reliance on Article 19 of the Treaty on 
European Union (“TEU”) in its Banco de Santander judgment is of 
specific note. Part III analyses the case law of the EFTA Court over the 
duration of its existence, and illustrates the liberal approach that the 
EFTA Court has taken in its understanding of referring bodies within 
the Article 34 SCA advisory opinion procedure. This Article argues 
that this liberal approach has meant that the EFTA Court has cared little 
for the independence of referring bodies. Part IV considers this 
widening gap between EU law and EEA law, and discusses the 
consequences of this increased divergence on what constitutes a 
referring body. Finally, Part V argues that with the application of EEA 
law now sufficiently in place in the EFTA states, the EFTA Court can 
begin, without depriving EEA law of its effect, to start finding requests 
for advisory opinions inadmissible, if the independence of individual 
referring bodies is not guaranteed to the standard that is applied by the 
CJEU. 
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A. Advisory Opinions of the EFTA Court 
The procedure for advisory opinion cases is set forth in Article 34 
of the SCA. It provides: 
The EFTA Court shall have jurisdiction to give advisory opinions 
on the interpretation of the EEA Agreement. 
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal in an 
EFTA State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers it necessary 
to enable it to give judgment, request the EFTA Court to give such 
an opinion. 
An EFTA State may in its internal legislation limit the right to 
request such an advisory opinion to courts and tribunals against 
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law. 
This advisory opinion procedure in EEA law is inspired by Article 
267 TFEU on the preliminary reference procedure in EU law. Article 
34 SCA and Article 267 TFEU do not have identical wording, but they 
correspond to achieving the same result. They both form the basis for 
inter-court cooperation and judicial dialogue, and are designed in such 
a way that they can take questions from national courts or tribunals, 
regardless of their instance within national hierarchies.5 Article 34 of 
the SCA can be said to be “modelled” on Article 267 of the TFEU,6 
and both “clearly have as their object to secure the homogeneous 
interpretation” of EEA law with EU law.7 According to the EFTA 
Court itself, the two procedures have “the same purpose.”8 In early case 
law, the EFTA Court stated that advisory opinions are “a specially 
established means of judicial co-operation between the [EFTA] Court 
and national courts [and tribunals] with the aim of providing the 
national courts [and tribunals] with the necessary elements of EEA law 
to decide the cases before them.”9 
 
5. See generally Graham Butler & John Cotter, Just Say No! Appeals against Orders for 
a Preliminary Reference, 26 EUR. PUB. L. 615 (2020). 
6. M. ELVIRA MENDÉZ-PINEDO & ÓLAFUR ÍSBERG HANNESSON, THE AUTHORITY OF 
EUROPEAN LAW: EXPLORING PRIMACY OF EU LAW AND EFFECT OF EEA LAW FROM 
EUROPEAN AND ICELANDIC PERSPECTIVES 235 (2012). 
7. Leif Sevón & Martin Johansson, The protection of the rights of individuals under the 
EEA Agreement, 24 EUR. L. REV. 373, 380 (1999).  
8. Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd. v. Kaupþing hf, Case E-18/11, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Judgment, ¶ 44 (Sept. 28, 2012). 
9. Ulf Samuelsson v. Svenska staten, Case E-1/95, EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment, ¶ 13 (June 
20, 1995). 
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However, there are important differences between Article 267 of 
the TFEU in EU law and Article 34 of the SCA in EEA law. First, 
Article 34 SCA is not a preliminary reference procedure, but instead, 
an advisory opinion.10 Advisory opinions of the EFTA Court are not, 
on the face of the text, binding on the referring bodies.11 This is in 
contrast with preliminary references of the CJEU, which are binding 
on the referring bodies.12 Advisory opinions of the EFTA Court are 
nonetheless labelled as judgments.13 Furthermore, Article 34 of the 
SCA does not oblige national courts and tribunals of final instance in 
EFTA states to request an advisory opinion of the EFTA Court, as 
opposed to a similar obligation on courts and tribunals of final instance 
in EU Member States.14 As confirmed by the EFTA Court in Irish Bank 
Resolution Corporation, there is “no obligation on national courts 
against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law 
to make a reference to the [EFTA] Court.”15 There is a “strong moral 
duty,” however, upon courts and tribunals of EFTA states to ask for 
advisory opinions.16 This is because “courts [or tribunals] against 
whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law will take 
due account of the fact that they are bound to fulfil their duty of 
loyalty,”17 which is derived from Article 3 of the EEA.18 
B. The Principle of Procedural Homogeneity 
EEA procedural law constitutes a non-substantive aspect of EEA 
law. The principle of homogeneity is a fundamental principle of EEA 
 
10. This said, the former President of the EFTA Court has said that the difference is 
“hardly visible.” Carl Baudenbacher, The EFTA Court: An Actor in the European Judicial 
Dialogue, 28 FORDHAM INT'L  L.J. 353, 359 (2004). 
11. Id. at 359. 
12. MORTEN BROBERG & NIELS FENGER, PRELIMINARY REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF JUSTICE 443 (2d ed. 2014). 
13. This said, the practice varied in earlier years of the EFTA Court’s life. For an overview 
of this historic practice, see Carl Baudenbacher, Reciprocity, in THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES 
OF EEA LAW: EEA-ITIES 35, 43 (2017). 
14. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union [TEU] and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [TFEU], art. 267 TFEU, June 7, 2016, O.J. C 202/1.  
15. Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd. v. Kaupþing hf, Case E-18/11, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Judgment,  ¶ 57 (Sept. 28, 2012). 
16. Ian S. Forrester, The Style of the EFTA Court, in THE EEA AND THE EFTA COURT: 
DECENTRED INTEGRATION 21, 40 (2014). 
17. Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd. v. Kaupþing hf, Case E-18/11, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Judgment,  ¶ 58 (Sept. 28, 2012). 
18. Agreement on the European Economic Area, Jan. 3, 1994, O.J. L 1/3 [hereinafter EEA 
Agreement].  
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law. It can even be said it is not just a principle, but the principle of 
EEA law. From the very founding of the EEA through the Oporto 
Agreement in 1992 (the “EEA Agreement”), the basic premise upon 
which the EEA was be situated was its attachment to EU law. 
Homogeneity was a “pragmatically expedient compromise”19 for its 
time in seeking expeditious political agreement. Homogeneity in legal 
terms was not just to cover EU substantive law,20 but also, EU 
procedural law.21 The preamble of the EEA Agreement enshrines 
procedural homogeneity within EEA law, stating that the EEA will be 
“based on common rules and equal conditions of competition and 
providing for the adequate means of enforcement including at the 
judicial level.”22 Whilst the preamble cannot be taken as having equal 
meaning with concrete provisions of the EEA Agreement, it was clear 
that procedural homogeneity would be strived for. As put, the 
homogeneity principle covers “substantive, effect-related, and 
procedural homogeneity”,23 and accordingly, procedural homogeneity 
“impl[ies] that, other things being equal, the EEA . . . [law] . . . should, 
by and large, live up to the same standards as the [EU law].”24 
Thus, the procedural homogeneity of EEA law with EU law went 
for both pre- and post-EEA Agreement, yet in slightly different ways. 
With regard to EU law before the signature of the EEA Agreement, 
Article 6 of the EEA made clear that the provisions, “in so far as they 
are identical in substance to corresponding rules of the [EU treaties] . . . 
shall, in their implementation and application, be interpreted in 
conformity with the relevant rulings of the [CJEU] . . . given prior to 
the date of signature of this Agreement.”25 With regard to EU law after 
 
19. Carl Baudenbacher, Between Homogeneity and Independence: The Legal Position of 
the EFTA Court in the European Economic Area, 3 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 169, 180 (1997). 
20. It must be noted that different legal systems can make it difficult to distinguish between 
substantive law and procedural law. See Walter Van Gerven, Bridging the gap between 
Community and national laws: Towards a principle of homogeneity in the field of legal 
remedies?, 32 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 679, 693-94 (1995). 
21. It can be viewed different ways. See Róbert R. Spanó, The Concept of Procedural 
Homogeneity, in JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA 152, 153-54 
(2012). 
22. EEA Agreement, supra note 18, preamble. 
23. Carl Baudenbacher & Michael-James Clifton, Courts of Regional Economic and 
Political Integration Agreements, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTRENATIONAL 
ADJUDICATION 250, 258 (Cesare P. R. Romano, Karen J. Alter, & Chrisanthi Avgerou eds., 
2014). 
24. Skúli Magnússon, The Authority of the EFTA Court, in THE FUNDAMENTAL 
PRINCIPLES OF EEA LAW: EEA-ITIES 139, 145 (Carl Baudenbacher ed., 2017).  
25. EEA Agreement, supra note 18, art. 6. 
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the signature of the EEA Agreement, Article 3(2) of the SCA set forth 
that the EFTA Court “shall pay due account to the principles laid down 
by the relevant rulings by [CJEU] given after the date of signature of 
the EEA Agreement.” 
Given this specificity on how to use EU law, the case law of the 
CJEU prior to May 2, 1992 was enshrined within EEA law, and the 
EFTA Court was the judicial body subscribed to develop EEA 
procedural law and guarantee procedural homogeneity. The case law 
of the CJEU after May 2, 1992, particularly noting that the EFTA Court 
“shall pay due account” to CJEU case law, meant it was a lesser 
obligation on the EFTA Court to achieve procedural homogeneity. As 
put, it is “formulated more flexibly.”26 Yet this difference has never 
been a license for the EFTA Court to depart on its own understanding 
of procedural law. In Restamark,27 the EFTA Court’s first ever case, it 
paid no attention to the difference between Article 6 of the EEA on the 
one hand, and Article 3 of the SCA on the other.28 Given the principle 
of homogeneity, EU procedural law29 and EEA procedural law are, for 
all intents and purposes, to be the same. This is supported by the intent 
that there is to be “homogeneity between . . . EEA rules and 
corresponding EU rules.”30 Given that EU law and EEA law have their 
own surveillance bodies (the European Commission and the EFTA 
Surveillance Authority (ESA)), and courts (the CJEU and the EFTA 
Court), it would be natural that giving effect to the principle would 
always be a struggle. 
Ensuring procedural homogeneity between EU law and EEA law 
was seen in the EFTA Court’s Posten Norge judgment, which sought 
to achieve absolute procedural homogeneity. Here, the EFTA Court 
stated that there is a “need to apply the principle of procedural 
homogeneity . . . to ensure equal access to justice for individuals and 
 
26. Per Christiansen, The EFTA Court, 22 EUR. L. REV. 539, 545 (1997). 
27. See Ravintoloitsijain Liiton Kustannus Oy Restamark, Case E-1/94, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Judgment (Dec. 16, 1994). 
28. For a critique of this aspect of the Restamark judgment, see Pål Wennerås, Article 6 
[Homogeneity], in AGREEMENT ON THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA: A COMMENTARY 209, 
212-13 (Finn Arnesen et al. eds., 2018). 
29. For the most elaborate research on EU procedural law, see KOEN LENAERTS, IGNACE 
MASELIS & KATHLEEN GUTMAN, EU PROCEDURAL LAW (Janek Tomasz Nowak ed., 3d ed. 
2014). 
30. Sven Norberg, Justice in the European Economic Area – The Role of the EFTA Court, 
in JUDICIAL PROTECTION IN THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AREA 29, 48 (2012). 
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economic operators throughout the EEA.”31 It formulated the same 
notion less beautifully previously in DB Schenker, stating that there is 
“the procedural branch of the principle of homogeneity.”32 Yet, the 
spirit of trying to achieve the principle of procedural homogeneity is 
not absolute as Posten Norge and DB Schenker might lead one to 
believe. As furnished in ESA v Iceland,33 the EFTA Court asserted that 
it can continue to be consistent with its own way of handling EEA 
procedural law, even where it deviates from EU procedural law on a 
similar point. Whilst some divergences between EU procedural law and 
EEA procedural law are permissible, that is only permissible to a point. 
In the EFTA Court’s early case law in Rainford-Towning, it said 
divergences can only occur under “specific circumstances,”34 which 
was repeated in ESA v Norway.35 However, the EFTA Court over time 
has sought to apply a stricter approach. This “specific circumstances” 
approach in Rainford-Towning was tightened to “compelling grounds” 
in L’Oréal.36 Over time therefore, the EFTA Court has raised the 
threshold for how divergence between EU law and EEA law are to be 
legally justified, in order to achieve the principle of homogeneity—
substantively and procedurally. 
II. INDEPENDENCE, REFERRING TRIBUNALS, AND THE CJEU 
Independence of referring bodies under the Article 267 of the 
TFEU (the preliminary reference procedure) is a necessary criterion for 
a case to be found admissible before the CJEU. One Advocate General 
has suggested that independence cannot be derived from a mere norm 
of independence, but rather, that independence of a referring body must 
be guaranteed by provisions which establish, “clearly and precisely,”37 
the status of the body and its independence. Taking that view, the mere 
 
31. Posten Norge AS v. EFTA Surveillance Authority, Case E-15/10, EFTA Ct. Rep. 
Judgment, ¶ 110 (Apr. 18, 2012).  
32. DB Schenker v EFTA Surveillance Authority, Case E-14/11, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Judgment, ¶ 77 (Dec. 21, 2012).  
33. See EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Iceland, Case E-16/11, EFTA Ct. Rep., Order of the 
President (Apr. 23, 2012). 
34. Herbert Rainford-Towning, Case E-3/98, EFTA Ct. Rep., Advisory Opinion of the 
Court, ¶ 21 (Dec. 19, 1998). 
35. See EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Kingdom of Norway, Case E-2/06, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Judgment, ¶ 59 (June 26, 2007). 
36. L’Oréal Norge AS v. Aarskog Per AS and Others and Smart Club Norge, Joined Cases 
E-9/07 and E-10/07, EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment, ¶ 31 (July 8, 2008). 
37. Case C-506/04, Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des Avocats du Barreau de Luxembourg, 
EU:C:2006:311, ¶ 50 (Opinion of Advocate General Stix-Hackl).  
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norm of independence of referring bodies is not enough, but instead, 
has to be sufficiently enshrined within law. 
As will be recognized, the path taken by the CJEU has become 
much firmer on the criterion of independence, and it will be 
demonstrated that the CJEU is now making an assertive attempt to 
clarify the notion of independence of national courts and tribunals 
within EU law—a mandatory criterion for an order for reference to be 
found admissible under Article 267 of the TFEU. Firstly, some of the 
older case law is examined to determine how much weight the CJEU 
placed on independence (Part II.A). Secondly, the recent case law of 
the CJEU is analyzed, which placed extensive weight on the 
independence of referring bodies (Part II.B). Thirdly, the effect of using 
Article 19 of the TEU as an independence tool is evaluated (Part II.C). 
A. The Historic Relevance of Independence 
Tracing the history of the independence requirement is not 
straightforward, for the CJEU only makes citations back to its prior 
case law in a selective fashion. The Vaassen-Göbbels38 criteria have 
long been the baseline for what constitutes a court or tribunal for the 
purposes of making an order for reference under Article 267 of the 
TFEU. These criteria were that a referring body: 1) must be established 
by law; 2) must be permanent; 3) has compulsory jurisdiction; 4) has a 
procedure that is inter partes (between parties); and 5) applies rules of 
law. Such criteria that the CJEU set out in Vaassen-Göbbels did not 
include anything about the independence of referring bodies under 
Article 267 of the TFEU. But that is not to say it was not considered at 
the time. Advocate General Gand in his Opinion in Vaassen-Göbbels 
considered it an applicable criterion,39 but the CJEU did not, and 
initially ignored the suggestion. 
Subsequent case law expanded Vaassen-Göbbels when it became 
clear that independence was to be a necessary sixth criterion. This arose 
in Pretore di Salò, where the CJEU stated that a national body could 
“request for a preliminary ruling if that request emanates from a court 
or tribunal which has acted in the general framework of its task of 
judging, independently and in accordance with the law, cases coming 
 
38. See Case C-61/65, G. Vaassen-Göbbels (a widow) v. Management of the 
Beambtenfonds voor het Mijnbedrijf, EU:C:1966:39. 
39. Case C-61/65, G. Vaassen-Göbbels (a widow) v. Management of the Beambtenfonds 
voor het Mijnbedrijf, EU:C:1966:25, p. 281 (Opinion of Advocate General Gand). 
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within the jurisdiction conferred on it by law, even though certain 
functions of that court or tribunal in the proceedings which gave rise to 
the reference for a preliminary ruling are not, strictly speaking, of a 
judicial nature.”40 The CJEU later confirmed in Almelo that Pretore di 
Salò was indeed adding the independence criterion to the Vaassen-
Göbbels criteria.41 
After this in Corbiau, the CJEU asserted that a referring body 
under Article 267 of the TFEU can “by its very nature . . . only mean 
an authority acting as a third party in relation to the authority which 
adopted the decision forming the subject-matter of the proceedings,”42 
thereby lacking an organizational link. Without explicitly referring to 
independence, this was the CJEU making clear that independence of 
referring bodies was to be necessary for a case to be deemed 
admissible. Therefore, the case law of the CJEU was clear—
independence of referring bodies sending orders for a preliminary 
reference was a clear criterion that must be met. 
B. The Current, Heightened Relevance of Independence 
In addition to this older case law, in 2020, a more forceful 
assertion of independence was set forth in Banco de Santander.43 
There, the European Commission, intervening, cast doubt on the 
independence of the members of the referring body, a tax tribunal, 
whose members were civil servants in a national ministry.44 In light of 
the intertwinement between the national ministry and the tax tribunal, 
Advocate General Hogan remarked that “it is . . . difficult to avoid the 
impression that the [referring body] itself is an integral part of the entire 
system of tax administration.”45 Furthermore, he stated there was “no 
clear legislative safeguards . . . to ensure the irremovability without just 
cause,”46 thus questioning the independence of the referring body. 
Whilst the referring body met the Vaassen-Göbbels criteria, it did not 
 
40. For example, with regard to referring bodies, Case C-14/86, Pretore di Salò v. Persons 
unknown, EU:C:1987:275, ¶ 7 (emphasis added).  
41. Case C-393/92, Municipality of Almelo and others v. NV Energiebedrijf Ijsselmij, 
EU:C:1994:171, ¶ 21.  
42. Case C-24/92, Pierre Corbiau v. Administration des contributions du Grand-Duché de 
Luxembourg, EU:C:1993:118, ¶ 15. 
43. See Case C-274/14, Banco de Santander SA, EU:C:2020:17.  
44. Id. ¶ 66. 
45. Case C-274/14, Banco de Santander SA, EU:C:2019:802, ¶ 20 (Opinion of Advocate 
General Hogan). 
46. Id. ¶ 25. 
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meet the additional independence criterion the CJEU had set down in 
Pretore di Salò. Therefore, Advocate General Hogan suggested the 
CJEU find the reference inadmissible.47 
Rather than relying on its previous case law on the independence 
built up under Article of the 267 TFEU; the CJEU in Banco de 
Santander instead indirectly invoked an independence criterion from a 
different area of the EU treaties altogether—Article 19 of the TEU.48 
The CJEU did not cite Article 19 of the TEU directly, but referred to 
Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,49 which did rely upon 
Article 19 of the TEU.50 The CJEU elaborated on independence as 
would apply to referring bodies, be they courts or tribunals. Here, in 
the Banco de Santander, the CJEU described the external dimension of 
independence, which it said was a body which functioned “wholly 
autonomously, without being subject to any hierarchical constraint or 
subordinated to any other body and without taking orders or 
instructions from any source whatsoever.”51 The CJEU continued that 
such functionality ensures “protect[ion] against external interventions 
or pressure liable to impair the independen[ce] of its members and to 
influence their decisions.”52 
In Banco de Santander, the CJEU also looked to the Associação 
Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses case,53 along with its Wilson 
judgment,54 to support its use of irremovability as a factor to consider 
whether independence is sufficiently protected. The CJEU then stated 
that the “principle of irremovability—” a principle that the CJEU 
 
47. Id. ¶ 45. Although he said that the CJEU had “no jurisdiction to rule on the request for 
a preliminary ruling”, he meant to have said, and should rather have said that “the request for a 
preliminary ruling must be deemed inadmissible.” 
48. For the use of Article 19 TEU in other contexts post-2009 when the Treaty of Lisbon 
entered into force, see Graham Butler, Implementing a Complete System of Legal Remedies in 
EU Foreign Affairs Law, 24 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 637, 648-50 (2018). 
49. Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, 
EU:C:2018:117. 
50. The Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses case had little to do with the Article 
267 TFEU preliminary reference procedure at all, other than the case coming to the CJEU 
through that procedure. 
51. Case C-274/14, Proceedings brought by Banco de Santander SA, EU:C:2020:17, ¶ 57. 
52. Id. 
53. Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, 
EU:C:2018:117, ¶ 44. 
54. Case C-506/04, Graham J. Wilson v. Ordre des avocats du barreau de Luxembourg, 
EU:C:2006:587.  
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appears to have created here—is of “cardinal importance.”55 Even more 
strongly, it said that for such a principle, “there can be no 
exceptions . . . unless they are warranted by legitimate and compelling 
grounds, subject to the principle of proportionality.”56 In its view, 
independence “requires that dismissals . . . should be guaranteed by 
specific rules,”57 relying on its prior case law of TDC I.58 In that case, 
the CJEU had previously ruled that a lack of rules governing 
removability are an insufficient guarantee of independence for 
members of referring bodies. In TDC I, once it was established that 
members of the referring body could be removed from office at the 
whim of the national executive, this meant the CJEU found it relatively 
straightforward to dismiss the case. Removability from office—the 
possibility thereof and the real practice therein—is an obvious issue 
that could call into question the independence of referring bodies, 
whatever their nature. In other words, the room for political 
interference was present, and unacceptable. 
For the internal dimension of independence in Banco de 
Santander, the CJEU understood this as “impartiality,” which is “to 
ensure a level playing field for the parties.”59 For this, it would require 
“objectivity and the absence of any interest in the outcome . . . apart 
from the strict application of the rule of law.”60 For meeting the 
“guarantees of independence,” the CJEU then further elaborated about 
such internal dimension of independence as covering rules on the 
composition of bodies, such as appointment procedures, length of 
service, grounds for abstention, and rejection and dismissal of 
members. This was so that it could be “dismiss[ed beyond] reasonable 
doubt . . . [of] . . . the imperviousness of that body”.61 The CJEU 
continued by stating that “the arrangements for removal of the . . . 
members . . . are not determined by specific rules”.62 Therefore, the 
CJEU was satisfied that the national law in question did “not ensure 
 
55. Case C-274/14, Banco de Santander SA, EU:C:2020:17, ¶ 59. This is no translation 
error. In French, “Le principe d’inamovibilité, dont il convient de souligner l’importance 
cardinale”. 
56. Id. (relying on Case C-619/18, European Comm’n v. Republic of Poland, 
EU:C:2019:531, ¶ 76 (June 24, 2019)). 
57. Banco de Santander SA, EU:C:2020:17, ¶ 60 (emphasis added). 
58. Case C-222/13, TDC A/S v. Erhvervsstyrelsen, EU:C:2014:2265. 
59. Banco de Santander SA, EU:C:2020:17, ¶ 61. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. ¶ 63. 
62. Id. ¶ 66 (emphasis added). 
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that the . . . members [of the tribunal] . . . are protected against direct 
or indirect external pressures that are liable to cast doubt on their 
independence”.63 
The CJEU stated that decisions of the tax tribunal (the referring 
body) could indeed be appealed to the national courts of the Member 
State, which in turn could make an order for a preliminary reference 
brought through Article 267 of the TFEU.64 Therefore, the 
effectiveness of EU law would be guaranteed. In light of these 
cumulative observations, the CJEU unequivocally stated that the 
referring body “does not satisfy the internal aspect of the requirement 
of independence that is characteristic of a court or tribunal,”65 and thus 
found the case to be inadmissible. 
C. The Cardinal Importance of Independence 
After the Vaassen-Göbbels test was created, it had two known 
issues that it developed—one immediate and the other later. Firstly, 
that there was no formal hierarchy in the contained criteria set down; 
and secondly, the criteria have subsequently been added to in later case 
law, meaning that the criteria was not to be considered exhaustive.66 
Whilst the lack of hierarchy or weight given to the criteria for the 
admissibility of an order for reference under Article 267 of the TFEU,67 
it is now clear, post-Banco de Santander, that independence is a 
fundamental criterion, in that without it, an order for reference will be 
deemed inadmissible. The notion of independence concerning courts 
laid out in Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses,68 was extended 
to cover tribunals—within the ambit of the preliminary reference 
procedures—by Banco de Santander. Associação Sindical dos Juízes 
Portugueses marked the first time that the Court applied Article 19 of 
 
63. Id. ¶ 68. 
64. Id. ¶ 79.  
65. Id. ¶ 77. 
66. The criteria has long been vague. Morten Broberg, Preliminary References by Public 
Administrative Bodies: When Are Public Administrative Bodies Competent to Make Preliminary 
References to the European Court of Justice?, 15 EUR. PUB. L. 207, 221 (2009). 
67. However, some view that the case law does “suggest . . . some of the criteria . . . are 
more important than others”. See MORTEN BROBERG & NIELS FENGER, PRELIMINARY 
REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 70 (2010); see also MORTEN BROBERG & 
NIELS FENGER, PRELIMINARY REFERENCES TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 73 (2d ed. 
2014). 
68. Case C-64/16, Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses v. Tribunal de Contas, 
EU:C:2018:117. 
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the TEU to national judiciaries. Likewise Banco de Santander was the 
first time Article 19 of the TEU was indirectly applied to the 
admissibility of an order for reference under Article 267 of the TFEU.69 
The latter judgment made clear that a lack of legal safeguards on the 
irremovability of members of referring bodies makes the independence 
of such bodies suspect. Thus, with assured tenure guaranteed by law, 
or specific rules, such bodies do not enjoy sufficient independence to 
be able to enter into judicial dialogue. 
Taken together, the independence criterion for making an order 
for reference that was absent in Vaassen-Göbbels, arrived in Pretore di 
Salò, was applied in Corbiau in a more forceful manner, and then 
applied even more strongly in Banco de Santander. Thus, 
independence of referring bodies is now an essential aspect of the 
nature of referring bodies for a case to be found admissible before the 
CJEU.70 Article 19(1) of the TEU, as indirectly utilized in Banco de 
Santander, drawing upon Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, 
now also serves as a source of re-enforcing the notion of independence 
of all kinds, and put an end to prior uncertainty by overturning 
Gabalfrisa.71 As put in Banco de Santander, “the principle of judicial 
independence is an essential component of the rule of law,”72 and the 
CJEU is Les Verts-ing the treaties in that it is a Union “based on the 
rule of law.”73 Thus, it can now be said that Article 19 of the TEU is a 
 
69. It should be noted, however, that the use of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
(“CFR”) differed. In Associação Sindical dos Juízes Portugueses, the CJEU relied upon Article 
19 TEU in addition to Article 47 CFR. In particular, it noted that “a court or tribunal’s 
independence is essential, as confirmed by the second subparagraph of Article 47 of the Charter, 
which refers to the access to an ‘independent’ tribunal as one of the requirements linked to the 
fundamental right to an effective remedy”. This use of Article 47 CFR on the right to an effective 
remedy and to a fair trial was not used in Banco de Santander at all. The Advocate General in 
Banco de Santander, however, did rely on Article 47 CFR. See Banco de Santander SA, 
EU:C:2019:802, ¶ 37 (Opinion of Advocate General Hogan). 
70. But it was not always this way. For criticism of the approach of the CJEU prior to 
Banco de Santander, and for firm approval of the CJEU’s Banco de Santander judgment, see 
Graham Butler, Independence of non-judicial bodies and orders for a preliminary reference to 
the Court of Justice, 45 EUR. L. REV. 870 (2020). 
71. Joined Cases C-110/98 to C-147/98, Gabalfrisa SL and Others v. Agencia Estatal de 
Administración Tributaria (AEAT), EU:C:2000:145. Indeed, Gabalfrisa is just one of many 
judgments in this regard, but it was one of the most suspect. For other cases, see id. 
72. Koen Lenaerts, New Horizons for the Rule of Law Within the EU, 21 GER. L.J. 29, 29 
(2020). 
73. Case C-294/83, Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. European Parliament, EU:C:1986:166, 
¶ 23. On the effect of Les Verts in other areas of EU law, see Graham Butler, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW OF THE EU’S COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: COMPETENCE AND 
INSTITUTIONS IN EXTERNAL RELATIONS 213 (2019). 
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“stand-alone, quasi-federal provision,”74 to apply throughout the entire 
system of the EU legal order. The CJEU is accordingly embarking on 
(re-)defining the ins and outs of the European judiciary, and leaving 
non-independent tribunals outside this vision. It can even be said the 
CJEU is—rightly or wrongly—imposing a particular view of how 
court-like bodies, such as tribunals, are to be structured within Member 
States. 
In pursuit of safeguarding the independence of the judiciary 
across Europe, a much more stringent test, indirectly using (or in the 
future, explicitly relying upon) Article 19 of the TEU is now to be the 
norm. For the EFTA Court, this poses some particular problems, given 
that it has a much more open approach to finding cases from tribunals 
admissible. When Banco de Santander was decided by the CJEU, no 
thought went into the impact this would have on the workings of 
advisory opinions at the EFTA Court, and the ramifications it would 
have on EEA law. The CJEU’s new departure in Banco de Santander 
calls for the EFTA Court to re-assess its case law, which is analyzed in 
the next section. 
III. INDEPENDENCE, REFERRING TRIBUNALS, AND THE EFTA 
COURT 
According to the EFTA Court’s own case law, theoretically, “a 
guarantee of judicial independence” should be present for referring 
bodies in its advisory opinion cases.75 However, EEA law mandates 
that the EFTA Court must take account of new CJEU case law.76 This, 
in effect, means that where the CJEU goes in EU law, the EFTA Court 
shall, and must subsequently follow in EEA law. This also means that 
the judgments of the EFTA Court are, in effect, never final. Whilst, in 
practice, this theory is a consideration, its handling by the EFTA Court 
leaves much to be desired. 
The EFTA Court’s approach to what constitutes a referable body 
for the purposes of an advisory opinion under Article 34 of the SCA is 
broad and liberal. The EFTA Court nearly goes to interpret Article 34 
of the SCA literally, in that requests for an advisory opinion of it can 
 
74. Laurent Pech & Sébastien Platon, Judicial independence under threat: The Court of 
Justice to the rescue in the ASJP case, 55 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 1827, 1838 (2018).  
75. Baudenbacher, supra note 19, at 189. 
76. EEA Agreement, supra note 18, art. 3(2).  
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be sent by “any court or tribunal in an EFTA State.”77 It has been 
claimed that a broad approach to who is a referable body “could 
potentially compensate” for “the facultative nature of Article 34 [of 
the] SCA.”78 As will be demonstrated, there remains “uncertainty as 
concerns the scope of the entities which may”79 refer under the advisory 
opinion procedure in Article 34 of the SCA. 
The EFTA Court must follow the CJEU when provisions, or the 
very purpose of provisions, are identical. Given that the advisory 
opinion procedure is the de facto equivalent of the preliminary 
reference procedure, as demonstrated above, the practice must be 
similar. However, as will be demonstrated, it is not. Firstly, the types 
of referring bodies in EFTA states applying the EEA Agreement that 
could come within the scope of Article 34 of the SCA is analyzed (Part 
III.A). Secondly, the case law of the EFTA Court is evaluated regarding 
cases that have been referred to it for an advisory opinion from 
referring bodies whose independence is in doubt (Part III.B). Thirdly, 
given long-standing concerns about the independence of the EFTA 
Court itself, this dimension is probed to determine the importance of 
independence of all actors for the purposes of EEA law (Part III.C). 
A. Types of Referring Bodies in EFTA States 
Since 1994 when the EEA Agreement came into effect, the EFTA 
Court has received requests for advisory opinions from a range of 
referring bodies. Many have come from courts in the traditional sense 
of the term, but others have some from other forms of tribunals. It has 
been known that the view of referring bodies as a court or tribunal in 
the EEA law “might be slightly different from the same notion in the 
EU [law].”80 Yet as the EFTA Court itself acknowledges, the definition 
of what a referable body is under EEA law is an autonomous concept, 
which in its own words, “must be given its own interpretation.”81 Or as 
later put by the EFTA Court, it “is determined on the basis of EEA 
 
77. The Surveillance and Court Agreement [SCA], 1994, O.J. L 344/1 (emphasis added). 
78. Pål Wennerås, Attorney General of Norway, in THE HANDBOOK OF EEA LAW 211, 
213 (Carl Baudenbacher ed., 2016). 
79. Id. 
80. Magnus Schmauch, Public Procurement, in THE HANDBOOK OF EEA LAW 605, 619 
(Carl Baudenbacher ed., 2016).  
81. Ravintoloitsijain Liiton Kustannus Oy Restamark, Case E-1/94, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Judgment, ¶ 24 (Dec. 16, 1994). 
324 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
law,”82 and not anything else, be it EU law or national law of EFTA 
states. It does not matter what the body is called in national law.83 
Many EFTA states have administrative bodies that exercise quasi-
judicial roles, which, across Europe, might otherwise be organized in 
courts. This is illustrated in the national law of respective EFTA states 
applying the EEA Agreement. For example, in Iceland, “a number of 
appellate committees . . . have the potential to satisfy the conditions for 
being classified as a court or tribunal,”84 for the purposes of Article 34 
of the SCA. There is one notable tribunal in particular, the Public 
Procurement Complaints Commission (Kærunefnd útboðsmála)85 
which has found its request for an advisory opinion admissible,86 but 
depending on how national bodies are counted, there are upwards of 
fifty national bodies in Iceland that could potentially be a referable 
body.87 
In Norway, much like Iceland, there are many “quasi-judicial 
administrative bodies . . . [that] . . . perform judicial functions in the 
material sense.”88 Five of these have made a request for an advisory 
opinion thus far. These have been the Norwegian Market Council 
 
82. Hellenic Capital Market Commission (HCMC), Case E-23/13, EFTA Court, 
Judgment, ¶ 34 (May 9, 2014). 
83. For an argument in agreement with this position, see Ólafur Ísberg Hannesson, 
Advisory opinions in the EEA: the Icelandic Supreme Court and the EFTA Court, 43 EUR. L. 
REV. 858, 859 (2018). 
84. Id. at 862. Similarly, “a considerable number of quasi-judicial bodies operat[e] under 
Icelandic law”. Skúli Magnússon, Icelandic Courts, in THE HANDBOOK OF EEA LAW 277, 282 
(Carl Baudenbacher ed., 2016). 
85. Different translations have been used for the Kærunefnd útboðsmála in English. These 
include the “Public Procurement Complaints Commission”, the “Public Procurements 
Complaints Committee”, and the “Complaint Committee for Public Procurement”. 
86. It sent its first and second requests for advisory opinions in 2019. See Tak – Malbik 
ehf. v. the Icelandic Road and Coastal Administration and Þróttur ehf, Case E-7/19, EFTA Court, 
Judgement (Jul. 16, 2020). See also Hraðbraut ehf. v. mennta- og menningarmálaráðuneytið, 
Verzlunarskóli Íslands ses., Tækniskólinn ehf., and Menntaskóli Borgarfjarðar ehf, Case E-
13/19, pending. In the Tak case, the EFTA Court made extensive reference to its Scanteam 
judgment, delivered by the EFTA Court on the same day – 16 July 2020. The Scanteam judgment 
is analyzed below in Part III.B of this Article (Independence of Referring Tribunals and the 
EFTA Court). 
87. Magnússon, supra note 84, at 279. 
88. Thomas Christian Poulsen, Norwegian Courts, in THE HANDBOOK OF EEA LAW 257, 
259 (Carl Baudenbacher ed., 2016). For further discussion, see Marthe Kristine Fjeld, Retten til 
å forelegge spørsmål for EFTA-domstolen etter domstolloven § 51 a, 48 LOV OG RETT 532-48 
(2009). 
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(Markedsrådet),89 the Norwegian Appeal Board for Health Personnel 
(Statens helsepersonellnemnd),90 the Norwegian Tax Appeals Board 
for the Central Tax Office for Large Enterprises (Skatteklagenemnda 
ved Sentralskattekontoret for storbedrifter),91 the Norwegian Board of 
Appeal for Industrial Property Rights (Klagenemnda for industrielle 
rettigheter),92 and the Norwegian Complaints Board for Public 
Procurement (Klagenemnda for offentlige anskaffelser).93 
In Liechtenstein, that EFTA state too has many tribunal entities, 
such as Liechtenstein Tax Commission (Landessteuerkommission), the 
Liechtenstein Real Estate Transfer Commission 
(Landesgrundverkehrskommission), amongst others,94 that could 
potentially come within the Article 34 of the SCA advisory opinion 
procedure. The Otto Kaufmann case demonstrated that a single judge 
within a national court (in this case the Princely Court of Liechtenstein 
(Fürstliches Landgericht)) when exercising particular functions, 
though not sitting as a national court ordinarily would, can still be 
considered a referable body for the purposes of Article 34 of the SCA.95 
Moreover, the EFTA Court has on more than one occasion found a 
request from the Appeals Commission96 of the Financial Market 
Authority (Beschwerdekommission der Finanzmarktaufsicht) 
admissible,97 and has a pending request for an advisory opinion on its 
 
89. Forbrukerombudet v. Mattel Scandinavia A/S, Joined Cases E-8/94 & E-9/94, EFTA 
Ct. Rep., Judgment (June 16, 1995); Pedicel AS v. Sosial- og helsedirektoratet, Case E-4/04, 
EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment (Feb. 25, 2005). 
90. Norwegian Appeal Board for Health Personnel – Appeal from A, Case E-1/11, EFTA 
Ct. Rep., Judgment (Dec. 15, 2011). 
91. Fred. Olsen and Others v. the Norwegian State, Joined Cases E-3/13 & E-20/13, EFTA 
Ct. Rep., Judgment (July 9, 2014). 
92. Norwegian Board of Appeal for Industrial Property Rights – Appeal from the 
Municipality of Oslo, Case E-5/16, EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment (Apr. 6, 2017). 
93. Scanteam AS v. The Norwegian Government, represented by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, Case E-8/19, EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment (July 16, 2020). 
94. Wilhelm Ungerank, Liechtenstein Courts, in THE HANDBOOK OF EEA LAW 293, 296-
97 (Carl Baudenbacher ed., 2016). 
95. See Proceedings concerning Otto Kaufmann AG, Case E-9/14, EFTA Ct. Rep., ¶ 29, 
Judgment (Nov. 10, 2014). 
96. The English translation of the body can vary between the “Appeals Commission”, 
“Complaints Commission”, and the “Board of Appeal”. 
97. Inconsult Anstalt v. Fincanzmarktaufsicht, Case E-4/09, EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment 
(Jan. 27, 2010). Subsequent cases from the same referring body are seen in Criminal Proceedings 
against B and B v. Finanzmarktaufsicht, Joined Cases E-26/15 & E-27/15, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Judgment (Aug. 3, 2016); Pintail AG v. Finanzmarktaufsicht, E-6/20, EFTA Ct. Rep., Order of 
the President (July 16, 2020). 
326 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
docket from the Board of Appeal for Administrative Matters 
(Beschwerdekommission für Verwaltungsangelegenheiten).98 
Consequently, in light of the variety of quasi-judicial, semi-
judicial committees, and assortment of tribunals in all three EFTA 
states applying the EEA Agreement, there would, over time, be an 
abundance of case law of the EFTA Court to determine whether such 
bodies were indeed referring bodies under Article 34 of the SCA, and 
whether they were sufficiently independent. As demonstrated in the 
next section, the EFTA Court has never declared a request for an 
advisory opinion inadmissible on the ground that the referring body 
lacked independence. This implies, as elaborated with nuances below, 
that the EFTA Court does not consider independence a criterion, and 
therefore, is not giving effect to procedural homogeneity, as it must 
under EEA law. 
B. Independence of Referring Tribunals and the EFTA Court 
The EFTA Court’s first ever case, Restamark,99 had to, as a 
procedural matter, consider whether the referring body requesting an 
advisory opinion was a “court or tribunal” within the meaning of 
Article 34 of the SCA. The referring body was the Appeals Committee 
of the Finnish Board of Customs (Tullilautakunta). At the time, Finland 
was one of the five EFTA states applying the EEA Agreement, before 
later acceding to the EU.100 Two EFTA states in the case, in addition to 
the ESA, were of the position that the case was inadmissible since the 
referring body could not be considered a court or tribunal. The referring 
body was a hybrid entity, which was not quite a court, and not a tribunal 
either. Rather, it was a public administrative body that was 
organizationally a part of the executive and administrative branch of 
the Finnish state. As made clear in the Report for the Hearing, all 
members of the referring body were civil servants, who are far from 
independent actors. Moreover, egregiously, the Chairman of the 
Appeals Board (the referring body) was the Director General of the 
Board of Customs. Therefore, the referring body was clearly not 
independent. 
 
98. Adpublisher AG v. J & K, Joined Cases E-11/19 & E-12/19, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Notification (Jan. 23, 2020). 
99. Ravintoloitsijain Liiton Kustannus Oy Restamark, Case E-1/94, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Judgment (Dec. 16, 1994). 
100. See generally Roger J. Goebel, The European Union Grows: The Constitutional 
Impact of the Accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1092 (1994). 
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These damning facts were nonetheless materially ignored by the 
EFTA Court, which found the case admissible. Whilst the EFTA Court 
said that it could look to the CJEU for its interpretation “of the same 
expression [court or tribunal] in Article [267 TFEU] . . . [which is] . . . 
relevant in this context,”101 it merely took note of the CJEU’s case law 
at that time, but only referred to one judgment that summarized the 
position of the CJEU.102 The EFTA Court commenced by stating that 
what a court or tribunal is for the purposes of Article 34 of the SCA 
“must be given its own interpretation.”103 By this, it meant that the way 
in which a referring body is classified in the national law of an EFTA 
state bears no determination as regards whether they can or cannot 
make a request for an advisory opinion to the EFTA Court. This part 
was perfectly consistent and homogenous with EU law, which has 
made similar determinations regarding referring bodies for the 
preliminary reference procedure.104 
However, from there, the EFTA Court in no way engaged with 
any of the details concerning the actual independence of the referring 
body, the Appeals Committee of the Finnish Board of Customs. The 
EFTA Court merely stated that Article 34 of the SCA is: 
. . . intended as a means of ensuring a uniform interpretation of the 
EEA Agreement and to provide assistance to the courts and 
tribunals in the EFTA States in cases in which they have to apply 
provisions of the EEA Agreement. That purpose must also be 
taken into account in interpreting the . . . “court or tribunal” 
expression.105  
Then it stated, miraculously, that despite the fact that the referring 
body “appears to be closely linked to the central customs 
administration,” that “on balance, the independence granted and 
assumed to be practi[c]ed by the [referring body] and the elements 
characteristic of judicial procedures prescribed for it lead to the 
conclusion that this body is, in fact and law, independent and 
 
101. Ravintoloitsijain Liiton Kustannus Oy Restamark, EFTA Ct. Rep. ¶ 24. The Report 
for the Hearing makes clear the EFTA Court took note of the CJEU case law, but this is omitted 
in its judgment. 
102. Id. ¶ 24 n.1. Case C-393/92, Municipality of Almelo and others v. NV Energiebedrijf 
Ijsselmij, EU:C:1994:171.  
103. Ravintoloitsijain Liiton Kustannus Oy Restamark, EFTA Ct. Rep. ¶ 24. 
104. For a full run-through on the history of the CJEU’s case law, see BROBERG & 
FENGER, supra note 67, at 59-104, first edition.  
105. Ravintoloitsijain Liiton Kustannus Oy Restamark, EFTA Ct. Rep. ¶ 25. 
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impartial.”106 Thus, the independence of the referring body in 
Restamark was assumed, rather than guaranteed in law. The full array 
of Vaassen-Göbbels and Pretore di Salò criteria was not present in 
Restamark. This view has been shared by a subsequent President of the 
EFTA Court, who stated that the CJEU criteria at the time “did not 
quite fit the bill of the [referring body].”107 Respectfully, it would not 
now either. 
For all the talk of homogeneity in the spirit of the EEA 
Agreement, the EFTA Court was trying to achieve homogeneity, but 
missed the mark, and was less than stringent on the test of 
independence than it ought to have been. Whilst the EFTA Court 
therefore took, as a point of departure, a “rather liberal approach,”108 it 
was not entirely homogenous with the CJEU. However, it was keeping 
“open the doors of the EFTA Court”109 for the time. Put another way, 
it was “quite obvious’” that the judgment of the “newly-established 
[EFTA] Court wanted to give individuals and economic operators 
broad access to justice.”110 Intriguingly, after Finland acceded to the 
EU in 1995, potential referring bodies in Finland would no longer go 
to the EFTA Court requesting an advisory opinion, but rather, to the 
CJEU through the order for reference procedure in Article 267 of the 
TFEU. The same referring body that requested an advisory opinion in 
Restamark—the Appeals Committee of the Finnish Board of 
Customs—was the first Finnish body to make an order for a 
preliminary reference from the CJEU under the Article 267 of the 
TFEU. However, the case was withdrawn,111 and so the CJEU never 
fully ruled on whether the Appeals Committee of the Finnish Board of 
Customs was indeed, a referable body under EU law. 
Subsequently in Mattel Scandinavia and Lego Norge, the EFTA 
Court acknowledged that the referring body who had asked for an 
advisory opinion, the Norwegian Market Council (Markedsrådet), was 
 
106. Id. ¶ 29. 
107. Baudenbacher, supra note 19, at 215.  
108. Carl Baudenbacher, The EFTA Court Ten Years On, in THE EFTA COURT: TEN 
YEARS ON 13, 21-22 (Carl Baudenbacher et al. eds., 2005). 
109. Vincent Kronenberger, Does the EFTA Court Interpret the EEA Agreement as if It 
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a questionable body for the purposes of Article 34 of the SCA. To begin 
with, it stated that “[i]t would seem that under Norwegian law the 
[referring body] is considered or treated as an administrative body 
rather than as a Court.”112 Nonetheless, applying the Restamark 
judgment on referable bodies, the EFTA Court found that the 
Norwegian Market Council could be a referable body for the purposes 
of Article 34 of the SCA.113 Accordingly, the approach of the EFTA 
Court, first elaborated in Restamark, became the “established case law 
of the EFTA Court”114 on what was a referable body, despite the fact 
that these referring bodies had questionable independence. 
Much later at the EFTA Court in Inconsult Anstalt, a request for 
an advisory opinion from the Appeals Commission of the Financial 
Market Authority (Beschwerdekommission der 
Finanzmarktaufsicht)115 was received, in which the independence of 
the referring body was explicitly questioned by the EFTA Court of its 
own motion. The EFTA Court made direct reference to the case law of 
the CJEU when considering what is a court or tribunal under the 
equivalent Article 267 of the TFEU, citing Dorsch Consult116 and 
Salzmann.117 Furthermore, in examining the national law in question, 
including the Liechtenstein Constitution and the applicable secondary 
legislation, it noted that referring body gave its rulings “without 
receiving any instructions and in total impartiality,”118 and that it had a 
status distinct and separate from that of the Financial Market Authority 
itself. Thus, the EFTA Court was satisfied that it exercised enough of 
a judicial function to be a referring body within the scope of Article 34 
of the SCA. Here in Inconsult Anstalt, just like it did in Restamark, the 
 
112. Forbrukerombudet v. Mattel Scandinavia A/S, Joined Cases E-8/94 & E-9/94, EFTA 
Ct. Rep., Judgment, ¶ 13 (June 16, 1995). 
113. Id. ¶ 12-16. 
114. Heikki Kanninen, The EFTA Court’s Early Days, in THE EEA AND THE EFTA 
COURT: DECENTRED INTEGRATION 13, 14 (EFTA Ct. ed., 2014).  
115. Inconsult Anstalt v. Finanzmarktaufsicht, Case E-4/09, EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment 
(Jan. 27, 2010). Subsequent cases from the same referring body are seen in Criminal Proceedings 
against B and B v. Finanzmarktaufsicht, Joined Cases E-26/15 & E-27/15, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Judgment (Aug. 3, 2016); Edmund Falkenhahn AG v. The Financial Market Authority 
(Finanzmarktaufsicht), Case E-9/17, EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment (May 30, 2018). 
116. Case C-54/96, Dorsch Consult Ingenieurgesellschaft mbH v. Bundesbaugesellschaft 
Berlin mbH, EU:C:1997:413, ¶ 23. 
117. Case C-178/99, Doris Salzmann, EU:C:2001:331, ¶ 13.  
118. Inconsult Anstalt v. Finanzmarktaufsicht, Case E-4/09, EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment, ¶ 
24 (Jan. 27, 2010).   
330 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
EFTA Court assumed independence of the referring body, without such 
independence being necessarily being guaranteed in law. 
Subsequently, the Dr A case afforded the EFTA Court with 
another opportunity to clarify its case law on the independence of a 
referring body under Article 34 of the SCA. The case was a request for 
an advisory opinion from the Norwegian Appeal Board for Health 
Personnel (Statens helsepersonellnemnd).119 The Norwegian 
Government took the position that the Appeal Board lacked 
independence, and therefore could not be considered a referable body. 
Specifically, the EFTA state claimed that the Appeal Board is a party 
to court proceedings in the EFTA state, and that it had “organi[z]ational 
links to other administrative authorities,”120 meaning that it would be 
compromised, and accordingly, lacked independence. Adopting a 
purposive approach, the EFTA Court explicitly changed tack from its 
prior judgments, and attempted to better motivate its position with 
reasoning. In line with its distance from the underlying principle of 
homogeneity, the EFTA Court stated that Article 34 of the SCA “does 
not require a strict interpretation of the terms court and tribunal,”121 
before setting out the applicable national law. This position by the 
EFTA Court of not adopting a “strict interpretation” of courts or 
tribunals has never been so explicitly put forward by the CJEU. 
With regard to independence of the referring body, the EFTA 
Court then stated that “[t]he concept of independence, which is inherent 
in the task of adjudication, implies above all that the body in question 
acts as a third party in relation to the authority which adopted the 
contested decision.”122 For external independence, the EFTA Court 
stated that this entails “that the [referring] body is protected against 
external intervention or pressure liable to jeopardi[z]e the independent 
judgment of its members as regards proceedings before them”;123 and 
for internal independence, that the referring body acts “impartiality . . . 
seek[ing] to ensure a level playing field for the parties to the 
proceedings and their respective interests in relation to the subject-
matter of those proceedings.”124 For the internal aspects of 
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independence, the EFTA Court relied on RTL Belgium SA of the 
CJEU,125 which in turn relied on Corbiau126 and Wilson.127 
Furthermore, specifically relying on CJEU case law, the EFTA Court 
stated that the independence of the referring body concerned “the 
composition of the body and the appointment, length of service and the 
grounds for abstention, rejection and dismissal of its members, in order 
to dismiss any reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the 
imperviousness of that body to external factors and its neutrality with 
respect to the interests before it.”128 
In light of this view of independence of referring bodies, the 
EFTA Court attempted to apply this to the case at hand, stating that the 
referring body (the Norwegian Appeal Board for Health Personnel) 
acted “without receiving any external instructions and with total 
impartiality,”129 and that it was “established as a specialist body for 
reviewing the decisions . . . and is the final arbiter in the administrative 
procedure.”130 It found the case from the referring body admissible.131 
Therefore, the Dr A judgment was an attempt at the EFTA Court trying 
to put a stronger attachment to the notion of independence of referring 
bodies. Yet at the same time, despite the reasoning offered, it was not 
subscribing to the case law of the CJEU fully. If anything, Dr A was an 
unclear assertion and de facto recognition that its prior reasoning on 
who was a referable body in Restamark was insufficient, and poorly 
reasoned. However, the EFTA Court in no way vindicated itself, as in 
no way did it overturn Restamark, but rather, merely indicated that it 
may be more stringent in the future. The hopes of procedural 
homogeneity from Dr A, and the expectation that the EFTA Court 
would become stricter, however, were short-lived, as demonstrated in 
Fred, Olsen and Others. 
Subsequently in Fred, Olsen and Others, the independence of the 
referring body arose again, this time concerning the Norwegian Tax 
Appeals Board for the Central Tax Office for Large Enterprises 
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(Skatteklagenemnda ved Sentralskattekontoret for storbedrifter). The 
European Commission raised concerns about the independence of the 
referring body.132 The Norwegian Government rowed in behind the 
European Commission, noting that the referring body was “not 
sufficiently protected against external intervention or pressure liable to 
jeopardi[z]e the independent judgment of its members as regards 
proceedings before them.”133 
The EFTA Court stated its main theory of independence, in which 
it “implies above all[,] that the [referring] body in question acts as a 
third party in relation to the authority which adopted the contested 
decision.”134 It furthered its analysis of independence as constituting 
two components—external independence and internal independence.  
On external independence, the EFTA Court stated that this involves a 
referring body being “protected against external intervention or 
pressure liable to jeopardi[z]e the independent judgment of its 
members as regards proceedings before them.”135 On internal 
independence, the EFTA Court stated this concerned “impartiality[,] 
and seeks to ensure a level playing field for the parties to the 
proceedings and their respective interests in relation to the subject-
matter of those proceedings.”136 
The EFTA Court then restated aspects of its Dr A judgment,137 
and applied them to the situation in Fred, Olsen and Others. It asserted 
that the fixed term lengths of referring bodies’ members—despite not 
being full-time positions138 and in addition to the fact they did not 
receive instructions from other authorities—meant that it had 
“professional, independent decision-making authority corresponding 
to that of a court.”139 As a result, the EFTA Court found the case 
admissible.140 The reasoning of the EFTA Court here was 
unconvincing, and appeared to have been at pains to find a way for the 
case to be deemed admissible. Taking the reasoning of the EFTA Court 
in Fred, Olsen and Others to its logical conclusion, this would in effect 
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mean that any administrative body, with minimal safeguards within an 
EFTA state, but not necessarily effective safeguards, could come 
within the scope of being a referable body under Article 34 of the SCA. 
This unpersuasive reasoning of the EFTA Court is highly regrettable, 
as is demonstrative of an ad hoc means of the EFTA Court skirting the 
strong independence criterion that is set down by the CJEU with regard 
to EU law. But Fred, Olsen and Others was not the end of the matter. 
Thereafter, in Municipality of Oslo,141 the Norwegian 
Government pleaded that the referring body, the Norwegian Board of 
Appeal for Industrial Property Rights (Klagenemnda for industrielle 
rettigheter), should not be considered a referable body under Article 34 
of the SCA. In pleading so, it relied on more recent CJEU law,142 
namely, TDC I143 and MT Højgaard and Züblin,144 which placed a 
strong emphasis on independence of referring bodies, which was more 
stringent that the EFTA Court’s own case law had been to date. In 
theoretical agreement, the EFTA Court expressly made clear that it 
follows the case law of the CJEU under its equivalent Article 267 of 
the TFEU preliminary reference procedure. In so doing, the EFTA 
Court stated that “[w]hen assessing whether a body is to be qualified as 
a court or tribunal under Article 34 SCA the [EFTA] Court takes 
account of a number of factors . . . [with] . . . [s]uch elements . . . 
also . . . found in the case law of the [CJEU].”145 
However, the Municipality of Oslo judgment of the EFTA Court 
further demonstrated the EFTA Court’s overtly relaxed approach to 
independence of referring bodies, in comparison with the CJEU. The 
EFTA Court stated that “the lack of rules on dismissal of the members 
comparable to those applicable to judges . . . are just one part of the 
overall examination of the factors characteri[z]ing the independence of 
the referring body.”146 Thus, an examination of the referring body 
“must be considered as a whole.”147 As a result, the EFTA Court found 
the referring body was independent given that two of its members were 
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judges, that its members were protected against removal, and that it did 
not take instructions from any other body.148 
Lastly, and most strikingly in Scanteam, the EFTA Court dealt 
with a request for an advisory opinion from the Complaints Board for 
Public Procurement (Klagenemnda for offentlige anskaffelser).149 This 
was the first case that the EFTA Court had the opportunity to engage 
with the Banco de Santander judgment of the CJEU—the new 
reassertion of independence of referring bodies—and bring about 
procedural homogeneity on the independence of referring bodies in 
EEA law. Yet, again however, the EFTA Court was at pains to avoid 
the jurisprudence of the CJEU. When the Complaints Board notified 
the parties in Scanteam that it was considering requesting an advisory 
opinion from the EFTA Court, the Norwegian Government questioned 
whether they even had the possibility to do so under Article 34 of the 
SCA.150 The referring body sought to rely on the prior Municipality of 
Oslo judgment, in which the Norwegian Board of Appeal for Industrial 
Property Rights, as analyzed above, had their request for an advisory 
opinion deemed admissible by the EFTA Court. The position of the 
referring body was, in essence, support by the ESA.151 
In Scanteam, the Norwegian Government stated152 that if the 
Complaints Board’s decision would be appealed to the ordinary courts, 
the Complaints Board would be a defendant in that case. By 
comparison, in the EU legal order, the CJEU ruled in comparable cases 
to TDC I153 and MT Højgaard and Züblin154 that if that occurs, such a 
referring body could not be considered independent. In Norway, the 
national legal protections against members of the ordinary courts, as 
opposed to those of the referring body in Scanteam varied widely. For 
example, removal of judges in Norway is protected by a full trial, 
whereas members of the Complaints Board may be dismissed for a 
“special reason” by the King in the Council of State, but without any 
further specific rules.155 Whilst it is clear that there are some judicial 
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features of the referring body, it did not meet them all, including the 
independence test that was strongly asserted in Banco de Santander, 
which required “specific rules,”156 and not just undefined special 
reasons. 
After the submissions of the parties in Scanteam,157 the CJEU had 
delivered its Banco de Santander judgment,158 and the Norwegian 
Government sought to explicitly rely upon the Banco de Santander 
judgment at the oral hearing in Scanteam that followed thereafter.159 
The Norwegian Government highlighted that the dismissal of members 
of the Complaints Board, the referring body, was not set down in 
legislative text, as found to be required under Banco de Santander in 
order for a case to be deemed admissible.160 Without such “specific 
rules” that Banco de Santander mandated, the Norwegian Government 
pleaded in Scanteam that the case was inadmissible. 
In its judgment in Scanteam, the EFTA Court began by reciting 
its prior judgments that favored the admissibility of the case, including 
Fred Olsen and Others on the factors to be taken into account,161 and 
Municipality of Oslo on Article 34 of the SCA not being given a strict 
interpretation.162 However, given that the notion of independence as 
stated by the CJEU in Banco de Santander would have meant the 
request for an advisory opinion in the Scanteam case would have to be 
deemed inadmissible, the EFTA Court then invoked a new weapon, 
resorting to a crass means of trying to justify admissibility in the case. 
For the first time on the issue of independence of referring bodies, the 
EFTA Court stated, which it had not done in the line of case law as 
analyzed above, that “[t]he interpretation of the notion of court or 
tribunal under Article 34 [of the] SCA must pay due regard to the 
constitutional and legal traditions of the EFTA States.”163 Following 
this nocuous claim to desperately find the case admissible, the EFTA 
Court returned to its prior (and repeatedly stated) incorrect assumption, 
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that to deem the case inadmissible would be tantamount to deny rights 
available under EEA law.164 
From there, without engaging in Banco de Santander and the full 
ramifications of the CJEU’s judgment,165 the EFTA Court stated that 
the “considerations . . . [of] . . . the judgment of the [CJEU] in Banco 
de Santander . . . [are] . . . not capable of altering the [EFTA] Court’s 
case law under Article 34 [of the] SCA.”166 When reciting the national 
legal protections in question, the EFTA Court merely stated that “[t]he 
Court understands that those rules are intended to ensure the 
impartiality of the members of the Complaints Board.”167 In addition 
to Scanteam, a separate judgment was delivered the same day in Tak.168 
In Tak, a case from the Icelandic Public Procurement Complaints 
Commission (Kærunefnd útboðsmála), admissibility was not 
contested, but the EFTA Court nonetheless said the referring body 
acted in a way that was “similar to a Court procedure,”169 but did not 
extensively engage with the national law concerned. 
Cumulatively therefore, the EFTA Court’s case law has been 
firstly, dishonest about the material independence of referring bodies 
(Restamark), before trying to pass off as if it was giving effect to the 
principle of procedural homogeneity (Dr A, and Fred, Olsen and 
Others), later merely casting independence aside by looking at the way 
referring bodies act as a whole (Municipality of Oslo), and later again, 
post-Banco de Santander, even daring to suggest that “constitutional 
and legal traditions” are relevant for ignoring the independence of 
referring bodies, as it did in Scanteam. Not once has the EFTA Court 
ever found a request for an advisory opinion under Article 34 of the 
SCA inadmissible because the referring body lacked independence. 
This was despite genuine and well-reasoned arguments put forward in 
many cases that independence of the referring body was certainly 
questionable. 
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C. The Independence of the EFTA Court 
Independence of referring bodies is not just concerned with the 
protection of European or national institutions. Nor is independence 
exclusively concerned with the beneficiaries of independence, such as 
individuals and entities under EU law and EEA law. Independence also 
concerns the institution of a judiciary more generally, serving as a 
protector of the rule of law. Thus, the independence of the EFTA Court 
itself is also important in EEA law. 
The independence of the EFTA Court itself can be directly 
analogized to that of national courts and tribunals in EFTA states, for 
which the same consideration of independence applies. Whilst it is 
accepted, as evident in Philip Morris Norway, that there is a “clear 
separation of functions between the [EFTA] Court and the national 
courts [and tribunals],”170 some characteristics cover both, which is 
their composition, under EEA law and national law respectively. What 
is common to both, from the point of view of the workings of the 
advisory opinion procedure, is that the dialogue is to be between 
independent actors. There have long been concerns about the 
independence of the EFTA Court itself,171 and they have even arisen in 
a case that the EFTA Court has had to assert, embarrassingly, its own 
independence. 
In Nobile, a case came before the EFTA Court, which was lodged 
at the same time as entirely different matters were ongoing concerning 
the re-appointment of a member of the EFTA Court for a reduced term 
of three-years, as opposed to the usual six-years.172 Procedurally, it had 
to be firstly decided whether the EFTA Court was properly composed. 
In a short “Decision of the [EFTA] Court” dealing with this procedural 
question that was taken before the substance was dealt with, the EFTA 
Court stated that the “principle of judicial independence is one of the 
fundamental values of the administrative of justice.”173 Subsequently, 
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in the same case, through an Order of the President denying the 
acceleration procedure, it was reflexively remarked that “concerns as 
to the independence of adjudicating bodies have recently been voiced 
in public debate and the utmost importance attached to the guarantees 
securing the independence of adjudicating bodies has been addressed 
in judicial proceedings on several occasions,”174 before proceeding to 
reference a number of CJEU judgments dealing with such issues.175 
The order continued, stating that “[t]o maintain the independence 
of the judiciary is not a privilege for judges, but a guarantee for the 
respect of these rights and a bulwark of the democratic order.”176 This 
was a firm acknowledgment that the independence of courts and 
tribunals in Europe in the era was a real challenge. If the independence 
of the EFTA Court was this important, then so is the independence of 
referring bodies. Yet, as demonstrated above, this has never been 
reflected in the case law of the EFTA Court to date. 
IV. MINDING THE (HOMOGENEITY) GAP BETWEEN EU LAW 
AND EEA LAW 
The starting position of the EFTA Court is that requests for 
advisory opinions are admissible, as detailed in Restamark,177 and that 
the equivalent of the Article 267 of the TFEU procedure in EEA law—
Article 34 of the SCA—“does not require a strict interpretation of the 
terms court and tribunal,” as the EFTA Court stated in Dr A,178 or is to 
have regard to the “constitutional and legal traditions of the EFTA 
States,” as put in Scanteam.179 One notable feature of the more recent 
EFTA Court judgments concerning who a referable body is 
demonstrates consistent referral back to its Restamark judgment. Yet 
Restamark was never the EFTA Court setting down its own test; rather, 
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it was a way of ensuring the first request it ever received for an advisory 
opinion was deemed admissible. With Banco de Santander from the 
CJEU now to hand, there is now a clear homogeneity gap widening 
even further between EU law and EEA law. If independence is to be 
taken seriously, EEA procedural law suggests that each referable body 
is assessed individually on a case-by-case basis as advisory opinions 
are requested.180 It is thus argued that the EFTA Court must now adopt 
a stricter stance on its admissibility criteria and the independence of 
referring bodies, in line with Banco de Santander, if homogeneity is to 
be retained. The Jonsson justification of the EFTA Court—that rights 
under EEA law are given effort to ensuring that “unnecessary mistakes 
in the interpretation and application of EEA law are avoided,”—181 is 
no longer sufficient. 
The widening gap between EU law and EEA law can be attributed 
to a number of reasons, but one is textual. The EU treaties have been 
updated on three substantive occasions since the EEA Agreement was 
first reached.182 By contrast, the EEA Agreement has not undergone 
any major update. Not all provisions of EU law are corresponded with 
in EEA law. EEA law is without its equivalent Article 19 of the TEU—
which guarantees effective judicial protection—which was indirectly 
relied upon in Banco de Santander as the central means of asserting 
independence of referring bodies, in particular tribunals, as a 
cornerstone of the EU legal order. Yet the essence of Article 19 of the 
TEU can be derived from elsewhere in EEA law, namely the EEA 
Agreement’s preamble, which stressed that there is “judicial defen[s]e” 
of rights under the Agreement.183 However, it can be argued that Article 
19 of the TEU’s closest cousin in EEA law is not in the EEA 
Agreement, but rather, in Article 27 of the SCA,184 or Article 30 of the 
SCA.185 The link between Article 34 of the SCA to the reach of Article 
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183. EEA Agreement, supra note 18, preamble. 
184. Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen, Bridging the Widening Gap between the EU Treaties 
and the Agreement on the European Economic Area, 18 EUR. L.  J. 868, 881 (2012).  
185. Halvard Haukeland Fredriksen, The EFTA Court, in THE LEGITIMACY OF 
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19 of the TEU may come by way of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).186 In Ásgeirsson, the EFTA Court stated that 
the advisory opinion procedure under Article 34 of the SCA must be 
interpreted in the light of Article 6(1) of the ECHR.187 In turn, there is 
also the link between Article 6 of the ECHR and Article 19 of the TEU. 
In theory therefore, the EFTA Court could bring the effect of Article 
19 of the TEU into EEA law by way of the ECHR, which all EFTA 
states are a party to. 
If the EFTA Court is going to mind the homogeneity gap between 
EU law and EEA law, there are several matters to consider. Firstly, 
homogeneity considerations with respect to EEA procedural law as 
applied to EU procedural law are of note (Part IV.A). Secondly, it is 
contended that the role of the ESA will be important in seeing that the 
EFTA Court takes independence more seriously, just as the European 
Commission has with respect to concerns about the independence of 
referring bodies at the CJEU (Part IV.B). Thirdly, it is argued that just 
because some referring bodies should be unable to make requests for 
advisory opinions under Article 34 of the SCA, does not in turn mean 
rights under EEA law are denied, given that decisions of referring 
bodies can be subject to judicial review in EFTA states by ordinary 
courts (Part IV.C). 
A. Homogeneity in EEA Procedural Law 
Homogeneity remains the key to unlocking the EFTA states’ 
access to the EU internal market. This goes for both substantive and 
procedural matters. It is, after all, a fundamental principle in EEA 
law,188 and is the “genesis” of EEA law, which “guarantees [the EEA’s] 
continued existence.”189 Consequently, “the principle of homogeneity 
 
186. On the ECHR and the EFTA Court more generally, see Robert Spano, The EFTA 
Court and Fundamental Rights, 13 EUR. CONST. L. R. 475-92 (2017). See Halvard Haukeland 
Fredriksen & Stian Øby Johansen, The EEA Agreement as a Jack-in-the-box in the Relationship 
Between the CJEU and the European Court?, 5 EUR. PAPERS 707 (forthcoming 2020). 
187. Ákæruvaldið (The Public Prosecutor) v. Ásgeir Logi Ásgeirsson, Axel Pétur 
Ásgeirsson and Helgi Már Reynisson, Case E-2/03, EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment, ¶ 23, (Dec. 12, 
2003).  
188. See Philipp Speitler, Judicial Homogeneity as a Fundamental Principle of the EEA, 
in THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF EEA LAW: EEA-ITIES 19-33 (Carl Baudenbacher ed., 
2017). 
189. Sven Norberg & Martin Johansson, The History of the EEA Agreement and the First 
Twenty Years of its Existence, in THE HANDBOOK OF EEA LAW 3, 35 (Carl Baudenbacher ed., 
2016).  
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exceeds the boundaries of the substantive provisions of the EEA.”190 
The CJEU and the EFTA Court monitor and pay attention to the work 
of each other’s courts, despite the latter’s obligation to follow the 
former. This is openly acknowledged in legal scholarship and some 
their respective judgments.191 Whilst this stands to benefit the principle 
of legal certainty, it also has other effects. By co-interpreting rules of 
different legal orders, they reinforce each other’s rules,192 but when the 
CJEU makes a major departure, the EFTA Court must follow. 
Access to both CJEU and the EFTA Court in EU law and EEA 
law in their respective procedures with national courts and tribunals is 
ideally meant to be the same, thereby ensuring homogeneity. However, 
if the case law in terms of who is a referable body under Article 267 of 
the TFEU and Article 34 of the SCA differs widely, as is the present 
situation, then such homogeneity is not guaranteed. As the EFTA Court 
itself stated in Irish Bank Resolution Corporation, “a dynamic and 
homogeneous [EEA] can only be achieved if . . . citizens and economic 
operators enjoy, relying upon EEA law, the same rights in both the EU 
and EFTA pillars of the EEA.”193 
The use of Article 34 of the SCA is a highly technical area of the 
law that the contracting states to the EEA Agreement have left to the 
EFTA Court to resolve. Admittedly, the consistency of Article 34 of 
the SCA is “a bit difficult to grasp,”194 but there is an obligation on the 
EFTA Court to ensure the procedure derived through it is tied to that 
of the application of Article 267 of the TFEU. Of course, the EFTA 
Court is entitled to its “distinct culture.”195 Yet that understanding has 
its own limits. There is legal certainty in ensuring that EU procedural 
 
190. Skúli Magnússon, On the Authority of Advisory Opinions: Reflections on the 
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193. Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd. v. Kaupþing hf, Case E-18/11, EFTA Ct. 
Rep., Judgment,  ¶ 122 (Sept. 28, 2012). 
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INTEGRATION 299, 307 (2014).  
195. Baudenbacher and Clifton, supra note 23, at 258. 
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law is implemented into EEA procedural law in its own way. The 
EFTA Court must raise its own standard on what it must demand of 
referring bodies, to insist on their independence, in order to receive an 
advisory opinion. If the EFTA Court does not change its case law on 
the independence of referring bodies, then the “hardly visible”196 claim 
of little difference between EU procedural law and EEA procedural law 
would evaporate. 
As put by the EFTA Court itself, “[i]n the interest of equal 
treatment and foreseeability for parties appearing before the 
[CJEU] . . . and the EFTA Court, . . . [EEA law] . . . should be 
interpreted and applied in the same way unless specific circumstances 
would justify different treatment.”197 Therefore, drawing a distinction 
where homogeneity is not needed would be both “arbitrary” and 
“inadequate,”198 from the point of view of maintaining the similarity of 
the two systems. It is submitted that no differential treatment for who 
is a referable body should be given. No such specific circumstances 
justify the EFTA Court’s liberal approach to finding cases from 
questionably independent bodies admissible. According to the EFTA 
Court itself, presumption or assumption of homogeneity between EU 
law and EEA is “enshrined in the EEA Agreement”, and thus, matters 
“are to be construed in the same way.”199 
In L’Oréal, the EFTA Court confirmed that its own case law must 
follow that of the CJEU, even when the EFTA Court has previously 
arrived at a different interpretation in its own case law.200 Whilst this 
case concerned a substantive issue, it follows that the principle of 
homogeneity that prevailed in L’Oréal with regard to substantive law, 
would also apply to procedural law. As put by the EFTA Court, it is 
“an inherent consequence of such a system that from time to time the 
two courts may come to different conclusions in their interpretation of 
the rules,”201 which is an acknowledgment that divergence happens, but 
not that it is desirable or correct. The L’Oréal judgment has further 
 
196. Baudenbacher, supra note 10. 
197. Eur. Banking Fed’n v. EFTA Surveillance Auth., Case E-9/04 COSTS, EFTA Ct. 
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199. EFTA Surveillance Auth. v. Kingdom of Norway, Case E-2/06, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Judgment, ¶ 59 (June 26, 2007). 
200. See generally L’Oréal Norge AS v. Aarskog Per AS and Others and Smart Club 
Norge, Joined Cases E-9/07 and E-10/07, EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment  
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narrowed the possibility for the EFTA Court to deviate from 
homogeneity, given it had to overturn its Maglite judgment,202 to bring 
itself in conformity with the CJEU’s Silhouette judgment.203 Whilst 
there remains different perspectives of the principle of homogeneity 
more generally,204 it stands to reason that the CJEU and the EFTA 
Court should rule on similar matters in a common way, achieving the 
same results, procedurally and substantively. 
The current President of the CJEU has written that the 
independence of referring bodies under Article 267 of the TFEU in EU 
law, and Article 34 of the SCA, is “of paramount importance[,] since it 
ensures the uniform application of EU law.”205 However, the former 
President of the EFTA Court has said that Article 34 of the SCA would 
potentially allow broader access to the advisory opinion procedure than 
the CJEU, even going as far to say that “it is not excluded that it would 
accept a reference from a private arbitral tribunal,”206 which would be 
unacceptable from the point of view of the CJEU, as demonstrated most 
strongly in Achmea.207 However, no case law of the EFTA Court yet 
exists on the admissibility of a request for an advisory opinion from an 
arbitral tribunal.208 As contended however, the dogma of the CJEU in 
Achmea would have to be applied by the EFTA Court, if it was asked. 
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B. The Role of the EFTA Surveillance Authority 
The ESA is beginning to take independence as a serious issue. It 
intervened at the CJEU in Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber 
of the Polish Supreme Court,209 stating that for the interpretation of 
both EU law and EEA law, it requires that national courts and tribunals 
have “full independence and with regard for the law only,” for 
otherwise, it “pose[s] a threat to the objective of uniform interpretation 
and application of EU [and] EEA law.”210 Strangely however, the ESA 
only pointed to the EFTA Court’s judgment in Restamark for this 
support in EEA law, and not any of its reasoning on independence in 
subsequent cases. Yet the ESA’s interest in the issue of independence 
is important, for it may one day have to plead (again) before the EFTA 
Court that a referring body requesting an advisory opinion of the EFTA 
Court under Article 34 of the SCA may not be sufficiently independent. 
The ESA’s position in Scanteam that the request for an advisory 
opinion should be deemed admissible, does not, for now, give rise to 
much hope in seeing the ESA wanting procedural homogeneity of EEA 
law with EU law. 
It is worth recalling that in Restamark, the ESA pleaded that the 
case should be declared inadmissible because its view was that a 
referring body was not to be considered a court or tribunal.211 The 
EFTA Court discarded the ESA’s plea and found the case admissible, 
despite real concerns of the independence of the referring body. The 
Restamark judgment was, in its time, in a newly established EFTA 
pillar of the EEA—but the EFTA Court was wrong then, and it is wrong 
now. The divergence between EU procedural law and EEA procedural 
law on who was a referring body has been recognized as different, in 
that “the EFTA Court was more liberal than the [CJEU] at the time.”212 
Yet the ESA was correct in Restamark—the referring body was not 
independent. When the ESA has another opportunity to plead the same 
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212. CARL BAUDENBACHER, THE EFTA COURT IN ACTION: FIVE LECTURES 20 (2010). 
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line of argumentation it did in Restamark before the EFTA Court, it 
should seize it, and disown the position that it adopted in Scanteam 
before the EFTA Court, and further elucidate its position in 
Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme 
Court before the CJEU. When advisory opinion cases come before the 
EFTA Court in the future, and the independence of the referring body 
is questionable, it will intriguing to see if the ESA will follow the 
position of the European Commission in Banco de Santander at the 
CJEU,213 as it should.  
C. Disputes Moving From the Administrative Venues to Judicial 
Arenas 
The approach of the former President of the EFTA Court 
regarding referable bodies under Article 34 of the SCA was “[i]f you 
are not overloaded, and we [were] not, then why should we throw out 
cases if the situation is not crystal clear?”214 This approach has never 
been accepted by the CJEU when it comes to the criterion of 
independence of referring bodies. Docket control, when exercised by 
the CJEU, has been conducted in other ways.215 When faced with 
questions about the independence of referring bodies, the CJEU has, 
by-and-large, ensured that questions of EU law are asked by 
independent actors.  
There is no reason to fear the EFTA Court tightening the criteria 
for admissibility, specifically on the independence criterion, for what 
constitutes a referable body. With respect to requests for advisory 
opinions, the docket of the EFTA Court is today predominantly made 
up of cases from national courts of EFTA states, that is to say ordinary 
courts, rather than from tribunals. To date, there has been nothing to 
suggest independence concerns regarding the national courts of 
Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway.216 The EFTA Court excluding 
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tribunals that lack independence would not end the effectiveness of 
EEA law, but rather, would strengthen it, as well as reinforce the true 
value of Article 34 of the SCA (emphasizing judicial dialogue, rather 
than administrative dialogue). In this vein, litigation in Denmark 
concerning referring bodies under EU law has had a similar experience, 
for which the EFTA Court should take due account of. 
In TDC I, the referring body—the Danish Telecommunications 
Complaints Board (Teleklagenævnet)—was found to lack 
independence by the CJEU,217 and thus, was not considered a referring 
body for the purposes of the preliminary reference procedure as 
contained in Article 267 of the TFEU. In effect, it was a non-judicial 
tribunal in the eyes of the CJEU. However, when the same case came 
before a national court on appeal, the national court made an order for 
reference under Article 267 of the TFEU—TDC II218—thus eliminating 
the question of independence, and allowing the substantive issue of EU 
law to be dealt with by the CJEU. This is, in theory, how the case in 
Scanteam should have evolved, with the EFTA Court finding the case 
inadmissible, and let the case come before the Norwegian courts. This 
alternative approach would have been fully compatible with the Banco 
de Santander judgment of the CJEU and ensured that the advisory 
opinion dialogue under Article 34 of the SCA remains between 
independent actors. This Danish example demonstrates how the 
narrowing of the number of referable bodies, and ensuring the 
independence of referring bodies, has not meant that parties are 
deprived their rights under EU law. 
The assertions and over-reliance of the EFTA Court on the claim 
that the advisory opinion procedure is “established so as to provide 
assistance to the courts and tribunals in the EFTA States in cases in 
which they have to apply provisions of EEA law,”219 as a means to find 
requests for referring bodies with question independence admissible, 
cannot continue to be relied upon. Yet the EFTA Court has implicitly 
rejected the TDC I and TDC II solution of the CJEU from EU law in 
EEA law. As seen in Municipality of Oslo, the EFTA Court said that 
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“[t]he argument that . . . [a] . . . case is likely to come before an 
ordinary . . . court . . . [that] . . . could . . . make a reference to the 
[EFTA] Court cannot of itself be decisive for the assessment of 
admissibility.”220 This is incorrect, and further marks divergent paths 
between EU procedural law and EEA procedural law. Moreover in 
Scanteam, the EFTA Court appears to have implicitly agreed that going 
to the ordinary courts would be prohibitive for the applicant on costs 
grounds.221 This imbedded result of the EFTA Court from both 
Municipality of Oslo and Scanteam is tantamount to putting economic 
factors ahead of the key constitutional concern of the independence of 
referring bodies. 
The EFTA Court is responsible for judicial protection in the EEA 
pillar. This is a general principle of EEA law.222 The issue of 
independence strikes at the heart of the EEA system, and the role that 
the EFTA Court plays in interpreting EEA law. Ultimately, advisory 
opinions from the EFTA Court are to be implemented at a national level 
by the referring body in the EFTA state. But such “practical 
contribution[s]”223 by the EFTA Court to requests for advisory opinions 
would be rendered meaningless if referring bodies were not acting in a 
position of independent authority. Access to justice is “an essential 
element of the EEA legal framework” as made clear in Bellona,224 so 
much so that in Piazza, the EFTA Court said that the “good functioning 
of the judicial systems is a common principle in the constitutional 
structure of the EEA Contracting Parties.”225 This naturally meant the 
system of judicial bodies in EFTA states and not non-independent 
tribunals. 
Judicial dialogue and cooperation cannot be occurring with 
referring bodies that, directly or indirectly, are answerable in some way 
to national executives of EFTA states without safeguards to their 
 
220. Id. ¶ 41. 
221. This was one of the grounds put forward by the applicant. See Scanteam AS v. The 
Norwegian Government, represented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, E-8/19, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Report for the Hearing, ¶ 44. 
222. Posten Norge AS v. EFTA Surveillance Authority, E-15/10, EFTA Ct. Rep., 
Judgment, ¶ 86 (Apr. 18, 2012). 
223. Koen Lenaerts, The Free Movement of Goods in EEA Law: The Philip Morris 
Norway, Commission v Italy and Mickelsson and Roos Cases, in THE EEA AND THE EFTA 
COURT: DECENTRED INTEGRATION 371, 385 (EFTA Court ed., 2014).  
224. Technologien Bau- und Wirtschaftsberatung GmbH and Bellona Foundation v. ESA, 
Case E-2/02, EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment, ¶ 36 (June 19, 2003). 
225. Paolo Piazza v. Paul Schurte AG, Case E-10/04, EFTA Ct. Rep., Judgment, ¶ 43 (July 
1, 2005). 
348 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 44:2 
independence. The reliance on national courts is immense. As 
demonstrated in Philip Morris Norway, the EFTA Court said that, “it 
is for the national court to ascertain the facts which have given rise to 
the dispute and to establish the consequences that they have for the 
judgment which it is required to deliver.”226 However, EEA law also 
mandates that administrative proceedings must be conducted in EFTA 
states “in a manner that does not impaired the . . . rights flowing from 
the EEA Agreement.”227 By contrast, the advisory opinion procedure 
under Article 34 of the SCA is for judicial dialogue between the EFTA 
Court and national courts and tribunals. It is not a means for tribunals 
that lack any form of independence. If the EFTA Court is to continue 
to apply the “same criteria”228 for referring bodies under Article 34 of 
the SCA that the CJEU does for Article 267 of the TFEU, then the 
EFTA Court will have to change course. EEA law requires no less. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Who may receive an advisory opinion from the EFTA Court is a 
constitutionally significant question as a matter of EEA law. When the 
EFTA Court eventually adopts Banco de Santander reasoning and 
curtails the number of referable bodies under Article 34 of the SCA, it 
will be a bitter pill for the EFTA Court to swallow. In effect, it would 
have to reconstruct its admissibility criteria for referring bodies that it 
tried to reason in its formative Restamark judgment. That, however, is 
the price of homogeneity. The CJEU’s Banco de Santander judgment 
clearly did not suit the agenda of the EFTA Court; so in Scanteam, the 
EFTA Court flimsily engaged with it, without grasping its true essence, 
and erroneously discarded it, as if it did not exist. Procedural 
homogeneity remains both “sensible and logical,”229 so it is puzzling 
why it continues to be discarded by the EFTA Court. 
If it is asked whether the EFTA Court can have a different 
standard for what is a referable body in EEA law compared to the CJEU 
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in EU law, the affirmative answer must be no. As argued, “the fate of 
the EEA Agreement hangs on its acceptance by the [CJEU].”230 Of 
foremost concern in EEA law is that homogeneity with EU law must 
be maintained. EEA procedural law must stay in line with EU 
procedural law. This is done in the judicial realm by the EFTA Court. 
The fact that the EFTA Court so rigorously pursues substantive 
homogeneity for the preservation of EEA law,231 means that it is 
inevitable that the EFTA Court will have to change its case law for 
achieving procedural homogeneity, succumbing to the CJEU’s case 
law on the independence of referring bodies. 
The EFTA Court has never turned down the possibility to provide 
an advisory opinion under Article 34 of the SCA to a referring body on 
the basis that the referring body failed to meet criteria. Some of the 
EFTA Court’s judgments on this issue could therefore be likened to the 
humorous Opinion of the Advocate General in De Coster, in which he 
stated that some of the CJEU’s old case law meant that “a question 
referred for a preliminary ruling by Sancho Panza as governor of the 
island of Barataria would be accepted.”232 Previously, the EFTA Court 
has found certain questions (but not cases) inadmissible, such as in 
Wilhelmsen;233 and the closest the EFTA Court has come to refusing a 
case under Article 34 of the SCA was in Hellenic Capital Market 
Commission, a reference from the Administrative Court of the 
Principality of Liechtenstein (Verwaltungsgerichtshof des Fürstentums 
Liechtenstein) in a case having nothing to do with the independence of 
the referring body. There, the EFTA Court stated it could not find a 
request for an advisory opinion admissible if a referring body would be 
exercising functions of “an administrative nature,”234 as opposed to 
judicial function. Specifically, the EFTA Court said that it would 
provide advisory opinions to national courts and tribunals “if it is called 
upon to give judgment in proceedings intended to lead to a decision of 
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a judicial nature.”235 If there is ever going to be an approach to a 
mutually understandable concept of what a referable body is for the 
purpose of the preliminary reference procedure in EU law, and for the 
advisory opinion procedure in EEA law, it will require an alignment of 
the case law between the CJEU and the EFTA Court. If the call for 
“effects-based” homogeneity is to be adhered to,236 then the EFTA 
Court must come into line. 
It has long been recognized that the differences between EU law 
and EEA law, albeit trying to achieve homogeneity, are indeed, 
“notorious.”237 Yet if the EFTA Court would deliberately stray from 
giving effect to the CJEU’s criterion of independence for referring 
bodies being a prerequisite for admissibility, future retaliation could be 
brought on by the CJEU. Fortunately, this should not happen as the 
EFTA Court can correct and amend its own case law, for there is no 
strict doctrine of precedent or stare decisis in EEA law.238 The EEA 
Agreement acts as a benchmark for other international agreements to 
which the EU is a party that entails internal market considerations. The 
CJEU’s placement of independence is at the heart of dispute settlement 
proceedings,239 and the EFTA Court not giving independence that same 
weight, has indirectly had a knock-on effect for the EU’s relationships 
with other third countries.240 The EFTA Court is no stranger to doing a 
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U-turn and bringing its own case law into line with that of the CJEU, 
as demonstrated in L’Oréal. As pointed to, “disagreement between the 
two courts is awkward and not sustainable in the long term.”241 When 
the EFTA Court adopts its own equivalent of Banco de Santander, 
notwithstanding the fact that it had the opportunity to in Scanteam, it 
will be keen to stress that EFTA states will still have to ensure effective 
judicial protection, and the effect of EEA law. 
It is typical of EFTA states to plead inadmissibility in many cases 
from bodies that, in their view, lack independence.242 Whilst the EFTA 
Court has never accepted this, the EFTA states clearly do have a valid 
point. Post-Banco de Santander, the arguments put forward by EFTA 
states that cases should be found inadmissible have stronger weight. In 
Dr A, Hellenic Capital Market Commission, Fred, Olsen and Others, 
Municipality of Oslo, and Scanteam, the EFTA Court held that a strict 
interpretation of the terms court and tribunal is not required in EEA 
law. Troublingly, it has said that “it would run counter to the purpose 
of Article 34 [of the] SCA to declare . . . reference[s] inadmissible.”243 
This is an unfortunate inaccuracy. As this Article has contended, 
procedural homogeneity weighs above the self-image of the EFTA 
Court as an adjudicator, for CJEU reasoning and outcomes will always 
prevail. It is dubious whether some referring bodies deemed admissible 
by the EFTA Court to date would now meet the CJEU’s revised criteria 
with a stronger independence streak, as seen in Banco de Santander. 
The EFTA Court’s Scanteam judgment, however, demonstrates a 
preponderance of the EFTA Court to overlook CJEU case law it does 
not like. 
What is striking about the contrasting positions of the EFTA Court 
in Fred, Olsen and Others on the hand one, and the CJEU in Banco de 
Santander is the striking resemblance of the referring bodies dealing 
with tax issues. This divergence, means that the EFTA Court’s 
approach to procedural homogeneity is insufficient, and will have to 
overrule itself at a future juncture. Article 34 of the SCA is a crucial 
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vehicle for ensuring the homogeneity of EU law and EEA law.244 If the 
EFTA Court refuses to change its own cases law post-Banco de 
Santander, it means that EEA procedural law will be failing to live up 
to the same standards as EU law. Adjudicators “must be independent 
in order to do justice.”245 Independence of courts and tribunals is one 
of the salient issues of our time. As put, “maintaining the independence 
of the judiciary forms a vital ingredient of the protection of rights 
generally,”246 wherever they are, in national law, EU law, or EEA law. 
The future case law of the EFTA Court will continue to deal with who 
is a referable body, and whether they are sufficiently independent. This 
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